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MOVEMENT, INTUITION AND THE VALIDITY OF LITERARY TRANSLATION 
 
 This article pursues the argument that translation, or a particular vision of literary translation, 
provides a way out of a linguistic quandary, and can re-establish the existential values of 
language. Every use of language, we might suppose, involves a double loss: (i) every term 
becomes, willy-nilly, a class term, subject to abstraction and conceptualisation, in the 
interests of easy transferability;1 one might argue that translation has a natural tendency to 
occupy this  ‘average’ ground, easing the way to swift and confident comprehension; (ii) 
nobody’s understanding and use of a term corresponds exactly with anyone else’s; if 
translation accepted the full implications of this proposition, what kind of strategy would it 
envisage? So this pair of statements confronts us with a contradiction: words become class 
terms in the interests of stability, in order that abstractions like ‘integrity’, ‘validity’, ‘joy’ 
carry their true moral weight and in order that fine distinctions can be made, between ‘vice’ 
and ‘evil’, for instance, or between ‘trustworthiness’ and ‘reliability’; and yet, in becoming 
class terms, they lose that particularity which gives them experiential value and which might 
guarantee a semantic immediacy. How we make contact, through language, with the 
experiential as against the conceptual, how we resist the constant translation of the 
experiential into the conceptual, remains a fundamental challenge to institutional responses to 
text. It suggests that we should shift the emphasis from research-based practice  – the 
translation of experimental data into a body of knowledge and a methodology - to practice-
based research – research as a mode of experiential becoming; that we should find ways of 
making Bergsonian intuition a more essential part of critical attitudes, although we would 
need to revise Bergson’s views on both language and translation; and that we should distrust 
validity as a critical criterion. 
My own translational ‘solution’ to this predicament is to move the translational 
objective away from text towards the readerly experience of text, towards the activities of 
consciousness and perception in the reader, and this involves my shifting allegiance from a 
monoglot reader (a reader who cannot read the source text) to a polyglot reader (a reader who 
can read the source text). I do not wish to do away with translation as a service to those not 
familiar with the language of the source text; but I do want to suggest that it militates against 
the discovery and exercise of experiential contingencies in language, and I do want to lay 
alongside that version of translation another, one which does not derive a ‘validity’ from 
fidelity to the source text, and in particular to the meaning of the source text, or from its use 
of methods, or theory, accredited by the profession/discipline, that is to say, one which 
applies to the act of translation procedures already tried and tested. I am in pursuit of a 
translation which explores the source text’s invisible, its virtualities and unrealised 
possibilities, as part of a reading process which naturally re-configures the text to maximize 
its experiential fruitfulness for the reader.  
What is the reading experience? I want to pick out two aspects, while recognizing that 
there are many others. But the two I select are peculiarly significant for translation. The first 
is that reading is a form of self-coordination, in which text is the instrument whereby we 
regain our capacity for perceptual/sensory cross-wiring, I mean the capacity to relate, to 
integrate, various aspects of our consciousness and feeling, various propensities, various 
behavioural characteristics.  Reading is an intersensory complicity in the text which will not 
take place if we surrender to interpretation. Translation is like an improvisation of ourselves 
through a given text, and thus an improvisation of that text. When we talk about reading as a 
process of self-coordination, we also mean that we are revealed to ourselves. Reading invites 
us to return to ourselves, to our entirety, without that, however, constituting a completeness; 
it is this incompleteness which necessitates a writing; this incompleteness is an inevitable 
concomitant of our being in movement, in duration, in a state of continuous becoming.  
Second, reading is a dynamic experience. Speech, however little phonated, introduces 
the paralinguistic and prosodic into the linguistic, that is, all those durational elements of 
voice – tone, intonation, tempo, loudness, pausing – which the printed text may from time to 
time imply, but gives no explicit indication of. We respond to text by vocalising it, by 
performing it, by tracing a body in it, rhythm in its paralinguistic or vocal multi-
dimensionality. Just as choreography turns the movement of music into one’s own dance, into 
the participation of one’s own body, so translation turns source text (reading) into target text 
(writing) by making reading a lived and living movement, which demands to be expressed, to 
be embodied, to initiate an activity that further develops. In short, we turn the movement of 
the reading eye that activates a text into a mobile text which activates the readerly body. 
Expressing it another way, we might say: a textual environment, set in dynamic motion by 
the act of reading, generates an action within us which we participate in, by ourselves acting 
(writing, drawing, doodling), an acting which takes us in new directions.  
This is a translational practice which espouses Bergsonian vitalism in several senses. 
Translation is not seen as a succession of finished states, of detached texts, but as an incessant 
variation which passes through different versions in the unfolding of its duration. These 
versions make no sense other than as a forward-rolling, expanding, interactive body of inputs: 
‘Duration is the continuous progress of the past which eats into the future and swells as it 
advances’ (1984, 498). The source text is not so much a completed event that needs to be 
retrieved, returned to; it is, in its very forward momentum, a metamorphic entity which is 
never the same, as self-differentiating as it is self-conserving.2 Duration is as irreversible as it 
is unpredictable; a work has no destiny to fulfil other than to be in the middle of organic 
mutation, even if, in retrospect, it looks as if it has moved along a predictable path; that is to 
say that translation projects the source text into the future as an unforeseen possibility and 
without any knowledge of its own consequences. That is also to say that duration is 
significant by virtue of being inhabited time, of being the very motions of experience and 
consciousness, not by what detaches itself from it, as product; the problem is that such a view 
leaves us deprived of the quantifiable and demonstrable. Can we bear to be deprived of the 
evaluative and judgemental capacity, the procedures of the intelligence, the instruments of 
validation, do we know how to cope with a non-immobilized subject of scrutiny, a subject 
which demands participation and practice instead? 
The intelligence, in Bergson’s eyes, puts us outside experience, and because its 
contacts with lived experience are always mediated by its own tools of analysis, those 
contacts are metadiscursive, at one remove, in the world of the signified rather than the 
signifier. The intelligence immobilizes and separates; it is the spirit that drives literary 
criticism, and that kind of translation which pursues an interpretative strategy. The 
procedures of the intelligence are also characterized by their adherence to ‘mechanism’ on 
the one hand, and ‘finalism’ on the other; where ‘mechanism’ concerns itself with structure, 
with positions and dispositions, networks and groundplans, the rationale of constitution, 
‘finalism’ concerns itself with sequence, order, the direction of structure, with teleology. In 
order to capture a body lifting its hand from A to B, the procedures just described address, 
from the outside, the curve AB, analysing it into a series of positions, an order: 
 But mechanism and finalism would both pass movement by, movement which is  
 reality itself. In a certain way, movement is more than a set of positions and their  
 order, because it is enough to produce it, in its indivisible simplicity, for the infinite  
 number of its successive positions and their order to be produced at the same time,  
 with, additionally, something which is neither order nor position but the essential  
 factor: mobility (1984, 572-3).  
 The indivisibility of movement as movement, so central to all Bergson’s thinking, relates 
crucially, too, to our attitudes to translation. It is part of the reason why we promote the 
notion of metamorphosis at the expense of choice, and why we insist on the variational 
development of sense across items of language rather than the grouping of competing items 
around a targeted meaning. The problem for the ‘designer’ of translations is precisely how to 
capture the ‘living’ momentum of reading, how to capture the interwoven dynamic of the pre-
reflective and the reflective, how to regenerate in the reader of the translation the constant 
activity of consciousness, how to avoid any suggestion that the target text is a post hoc 
interpretation of the source text, how to maximize the sense of something in mutational 
process. And this in turn entails a re-orientation of our notion of rhythm, now understood 
more as a mode of apprehension of the object than as a property belonging to the object, the 
rhythm of reading rather than of what is being read.  
If I emphasize rhythm as a mode of perception, of processing by consciousness, it is 
for three reasons. First, it is perhaps a perfect exemplar of Bergsonian movement. If I make 
that claim it is because I distinguish fundamentally between the rhythmic and the metric (see 
2012, 111-32), in a way, perhaps, not shared by other commentators who look upon rhythm 
as a freedom within, or a variation on, metre, to be described in essentially metrical terms 
(stress/accent, syllable). For me, rhythm is non-recurrent (irreversible), continuous, 
heterogeneous and qualitative; it is a variational weave of duration; one may speak of the 
duration that inhabits rhythm, but one should also say that rhythm is the very rhythm of 
duration. Metre, on the other hand, is a separable pattern (‘mechanism’, abstract); it is 
discontinuous (unitised), homogeneous (repeated units) and quantitative (measurable). Metre 
is a standardized sequence of units which parcel up/are parcelled up by chronometric time 
(rather than duration).  
It is the multi-dimensionality of rhythm – deriving as we have said, from the 
investment of the linguistic by the paralinguistic (intonation, tempo, amplitude, pausing, 
respiration, etc.) - which, second, ensures that it is physically incorporative of the reader, that 
it is, kinaesthetically, a whole-body experience. This is not to deny that metre will also 
produce kinaesthetic experience, but of a much more restricted kind; and while rhythm is that 
medium/energy/force by which the reader is absorbed into the world generated by textual 
dynamics, as an agentive participant, metre is an analytical instrument which informs the 
hearing of the text and its modes of linear distribution, but does not pretend to embody the 
experiential making of, and responding to, the text. 
Finally and third, and consequential upon the points already made, rhythm is a natural 
expression of the intuitive, while metre gravitates towards the mental habits of the 
intelligence. Intuition, that ‘divining sympathy’ (1984, 644), has powers of empathetic 
penetration, which establish the contact of one’s own duration with that of another (1984, 
645). What then is involved when the focus of the translator shifts from comprehension of the 
text to intuition of the text? What distinguishes an intuitive translation from an analytical or 
interpretative one?  An intuitional translation grapples with rather more than the words of the 
text themselves, whose translation might turn out to be little or no different from a version 
supplied by the interpretative intelligence. What intuitional translation grapples with is the 
‘theatre’ of consciousness as it processes text, the durational experience of a body in the thick 
of contingent, indeterminate, textual eventfulness, keeping track of its own flux. 
 In ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, Bergson uses translation as an illustration of any 
analytical (empirical, rational), as opposed to intuitional,3 mode of apprehending a 
phenomenon: 
 
 […] analysis is the operation which draws the object back to familiar constituents, that  
 is to say, constituents common to this object and to others. […] Every analysis is thus a  
 translation, a development in symbols, a representation from successive points of view  
 from which one identifies just so many shared features between the new object being  
 studied and other objects which one already reckons to have knowledge of. In its  
 eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which it is condemned to turn,  
 analysis endlessly multiplies points of view, to complete the never completed  
 representation, tirelessly varies the symbols to perfect an ever-imperfect translation  
 (1984, 1395-6). 
 
This account leaves us with the difficult task of reconciling our view of translation which is 
fundamentally Bergsonian in spirit with the views of Bergson himself, which tend to 
denigrate translation. It is easy to say that Bergson, like us, is implicitly attacking a view of 
translation which has surrendered the intuitional to the analytical, or, in my terms, which has 
surrendered durational reading experience to the immobilizations of interpretation, or the 
multi-dimensional and qualitative rhythms of the reading consciousness to the recuperation of 
mono-dimensional and quantitative textual rhythms. 
 But this large agreement conceals details of terminology and attitude that are more 
difficult to negotiate, largely because Bergson’s view of intuition seems to preclude any 
possibility of translational success;4 for Bergson, in fact, intuition is the apprehension of the 
untranslatable, the inexpressible, and translation, however self-multiplying, will always be 
second best.5 In presenting a new version of translation, a translation seeking to espouse the 
text-intuitional, how would we wish to take issue with Bergson?   
  Translation is not, as Bergson supposes, a quest for an ever-more proximate fidelity. 
Translation journeys away from the source text in an indefatigable exploration of the reading 
experiences its allows/begets, which are bound to be different with each reader and with each 
reading. We might disagree with Bergson and propose that these variations do render ‘the 
inner meaning of the original’ (1984, 1395), but one would need to interpret ‘inner meaning’ 
precisely as that which, in the source text, does not find an exteriority, that is to say, its 
invisible, its expressive exploitability, its translatability. Nor would we wish to think of the 
source text as the original. Thus, this kind of translation is not a representation of the original 
and does not trade in ‘symbols’, if these are to be understood as a metadiscursive treatment. 
And this version of translation does not operate in the world of the already known, translating 
the given with a given, a world that is circumscriptive; on the contrary, as we have said, 
translation is an ‘invalid’ practice-based research, a constant re-invention of what might be 
created out of intralinguistic and interlinguistic, intertextual and extratextual, cross-sensory 
and inter-medial activity.      
 But there are further qualifications to be added. If Bergson wishes to describe 
intuition as ‘the disinterested knowledge of an object one aims […] to grasp in itself’ (1984, 
1410), then there are three senses in which I would wish to hesitate or demur. Intuition is an 
existential sympathy which does not bring knowledge in the sense of cognitive information or 
identification of stable characteristics; it is, so to speak, shared experience, in all its vivid 
immediacy. It is ‘disinterested’ in its espousal of otherness, but it is a wedding, it has interests 
of its own, a mutuality of input into the momentums that the wedding itself blends. This then 
disqualifies ‘[which] one aims […] to grasp in itself’, not because of the wedding alone, but 
also because there is no ‘itself’: there is a multiplicity of experiential encounters, all in the 
mode of becoming, so that an ‘itself’ is never more than an ever-changing virtuality. Finally, 
and in the light of these remarks, one should insist that translational language, as an 
intuitional language, is no longer the metadiscursive language of ‘symbols’ that Bergson 
imagines it to be and which it naturally is in ‘standard’ interpretative translation; it is no 
longer a representation or re-presentation or interpretation of the source text, nor the signified 
of the source text’s signifier; it is itself a signifier cohabiting, and collaborating in, the source 
text’s sense-generating duration; the target text draws its language from the same perceptual 
and psycho-physiological source as the source text.  
But here, too, we need to be quite clear. Our preference, in ‘sense-generating’, for the 
word ‘sense’ over the word ‘meaning’ is guided by the need to speak of a signifying process 
itself caught in movement, in becoming. Meaning is altogether too much an objective, 
something arrived at, a conceptual substance, while sense allows a glancing, elusive, 
changing, kaleidoscopic semantic. To read and write in the spirit of duration is to treat the 
semantic not as a goal but as a passage, not as a combination or interplay of semantemes 
generated by language and presented for our inspection and consumption, but as the 
indivisible, undecomposable foam of senses deriving from our own immersion in language as 
readers, reading into and across language rather than out of and away from language, towards 
the dictionary, towards a valid account.  
But our disagreement with Bergson does not pertain to the concept of translation 
alone; it pertains, too, to the processing of linguistic sequence. Bergson concludes that ‘the 
mechanism of our day-to-day knowledge is of a cinematographic kind’ (1984, 753); it 
restores movement to immobilized states, yes, but from the outside and in a form that is 
abstract and uniform. Bergson also suggests that we use language cinematographically (1984, 
759). Reading seems to set words in motion rather as a projector sets images in motion; but 
this, suggests Bergson, merely repeats the illusion which underlies the cinematographic. 
Reading is not so much a triggering of motion in words as the eye’s passage through them, 
which leaves words as separate entities (dictionary entries) and allows them, as ‘imaginary 
stases’ (1984, 759), to perpetuate illogicalities. We should not be led to believe that the 
movement of the projected spools of film have actually introduced movement into the frames 
of the film, that the scenes depicted in those frames have entered their own duration. They 
have not. They have been given succession but are themselves still immobile. But this seems 
to me a misrepresentation. In reading, we draw the sequence of language into our own 
duration, partly because we activate processes of anticipation and memory, partly because we 
harness the rhythms of language to our own rhythms of apprehension/perception, and partly 
because our cognitive faculties are constantly busied with the multiplications and 
reconfigurations of sense (rather than with the procession of meaning). These attributes of the 
reading consciousness are all fully Bergsonian in spirit; it is just that his attachment to the 
model of a duplicitous cinematography, and his wish to increase its detrimental effects, 
prevents him from allowing them.   
The same cinematographic truth, Bergson would argue, governs strings of words 
introduced into speech-flow by the reading voice. But he would be wrong. And he would be 
wrong for the simple reason that the voice fundamentally changes our perception of printed 
language, even if it is only reading printed language silently. There is, that is to say, a 
duration linguistically sui generis in speech that there is not in printed language. We might 
pick out, among others, four ways in which voiced language is a durational transformation of 
the written language. First, the values of apparently identical phonemes are 
paralinguistically/vocally differentiated where an IPA transcription would make no 
distinctions; as Edward Sapir (1949, 43) points out: ‘Probably not one English speaker out of 
a hundred has the remotest idea that the t of a word like sting is not at all the same sound as 
the t of teem, the latter t having a fullness of ‘breath release’ that is inhibited in the former 
case by the preceding s; that the ea of meat is of perceptibly shorter duration than the ea of 
mead [because the latter is followed by a voiced consonant]; or that the final s of a word like 
heads is not the full buzzing sound of the s in such a word as please’. Second, the voice 
distributes the sounds of phonemes, to maintain speech-flow, where the printed language 
segregates them. Stephen Handel points out, for example, that ‘The spelling of the word cat is 
“c” followed by “a” followed by “t”. If, however, we try to cut out the “c” part from a tape 
recording, no unique section can be found. The “c” permeates the entire word acoustically, 
albeit not perceptually’ (1989, 2) and further generalises: ‘The production system must cheat 
in order to get all the sounds out rapidly: movements appropriate to several successive sounds 
must be made simultaneously, and movements necessary to produce future sounds must be 
started early enough to ensure that the vocal tract will be in the correct position to make those 
sounds when they are required’ (1989, 134). Third, speech, as we have seen, introduces the 
paralinguistic and prosodic into the linguistic; where the printed text is only a segmented 
language, vocal realization supplies a durational momentum expressed in so-called supra-
segmental features (tone, intonation, dynamics (in the musical sense), tempo, pausing, etc.). 
Fourth, and finally, this suffusion of the verbal network by the paralinguistic indicates the 
informing of the text by rhythm, such that metre, the pre-vocal identification of the syllabic 
and accentual constitution of the verse is absorbed into the rhythmic as a raw material, as a 
particular and malleable dimension of its multi-dimensionality. Rhythm, then, is not just one 
feature alongside the multiple other features of the spoken text; it is the animating and 
shaping force that inhabits and drives all those features, the operating principle of the whole 
text in the reading mind.       
In order to capture the elusive prey that duration is, in order to do its some justice in 
our translational practice, what options are open to us? We might, quite simply, accept that, 
by definition, we shall never be able properly to express duration or the activity of intuition, 
and accept, too, that we are bound to adopt analytical means as a way of building our 
‘knowledge’ of the reading of verse. Bergson, after all, perfectly well accepts that analysis is 
a proper and valid use of the human intelligence, its ‘natural’ mode for apprehending reality, 
however artificial it is. We must merely be sure to acknowledge that it is only half the story, 
and be conscious of the ways in which it falls short. But we can also attempt to coax the 
analytical into deviating into the durational, principally by page-design, by a page-design 
which puts the known of language in doubt, which makes the voice constantly re-assess its 
modes of delivery, its segmentative habits, its phrasal groupings, its acoustic distribution. 
Page-design might become the instrument whereby what was text becomes a scenario, 
becomes a pre-textual scansion, or projection of vocalized text, inviting, by its very nature, 
multiple other scansions, because it embodies the truly possible, not a possible that 
retrospection identifies as a highly probable. So the text is a pre-performance script. But it is 
at the same time itself a performance or a performativity, summoning other kinds of textual 
performance, other page-designs. In this way, the page outwits the trap of space and the 
spatialized; instead it acts as an invitation into time, it activates time. Where previously the 
scansion of a poetic text was a way of evidentially validating one kind of metrical reading, 
the text-as-scansion is designed to invite a ‘programme’ of (self-)investigative 
experimentations, or explorations, which supersede any notion of validity but are not 
themselves self-superseding. 
This, then, is now a language which we are encouraged to listen to differently, not 
simply in order to pick out, recognize, those acoustic elements already identified in the 
written text - alliteration, assonance, rhyme, iambic pentameter, the alexandrine, etc. – but 
rather to steep ourselves in the polymorphous meanderings of rhythm and what it lives on in 
the way of phonetic modulations, accords and discords, crisp and drawled enunciations, the 
whispering and declamatory; these are not the incidentals of individual voices which do 
nothing to change the underlying meaning of the text; these are investments of the text with 
voice, rather than vice versa, which actively constitutes the very substance of verbal duration. 
What agent, other than the speaking voice, can change language from a sequence or 
succession of separate lexical entities into a fused flowing, a flowing which incorporates 
pausing, and silence itself, into duration, into textual becoming, into the discourse of a 
speaking subject, into the integrated multi-dimensionality of rhythmic unfolding. Voice 
changes the very nature of printed language, acoustically, rhythmically, in the way it 
distributes sense rather than gathers meaning, in its paralinguistic animation. The prejudice 
against voice in the world of metrical analysis is firm and of long standing, and reflects a 
deep distrust of an uncontrollable, unquantifiable, unpredictable energy which runs directly 
against the desire to establish linguistic fact in the printed text, which itself undergoes no 
change.  
Let us then be clear. Bergson looks upon language as an impediment to our getting 
close to intuitional experience, to duration. Language has a natural tendency to serve analysis, 
to turn percept into concept, to make abstract and to generalize, and thus to travel away from 
immediacy of contact and from exactitude. Language converts all experience into versions of 
the already known, of available knowledge, and, as we have just seen, it suffers from the 
same delusions as cinematography: it supposes that words enter duration by virtue of being 
spoken, but it is actually only the voice that enters duration, using words – which themselves 
continue to exist as separable units – as its instrument. Our view is that Bergson’s thinking is 
unnecessarily pessimistic. But there are mitigating circumstances. 
Bergson gives one of his fullest accounts of the capturing of duration in language 
towards the end of the second part of the introduction to The Creative Mind: An Introduction 
to Metaphysics (La Pensée et le mouvant (1934)) (1984, 1326-8). Reading is the key: it is not 
to do with comprehension so much as with thinking one’s way into text by adopting the 
procedure of the author, and reading aloud is the best way to achieve this self-assimilation. 
Perception of the movement of discourse, direct communication with the author’s thought, 
derives from a vocal/dictional inhabitation of the text’s rhythm and punctuation: 
 
 To mark punctuation and rhythm as is proper, to take account of the  
 temporal relations between different sentences of the paragraph and different phrases  
 of the sentence, to follow, uninterruptedly, the crescendo of feeling and thought to the  
 point musically noted as culminating, that is what the art of diction is first and  
 foremost all about (1984, 1327). 
 
The art of reading, in short, is the intuitional art of espousing the creative evolution of text. 
Elsewhere, in a lecture on ‘L’âme et le corps’ delivered in 1912, and collected with other 
essays and lectures in Mind-Energy (L’Énergie spirituelle (1919)), Bergson fleshes out a little 
what his notion of rhythm entails. Rhythm is the indivisible movement that thought is and the 
words that emerge from this flux are like snapshots or film-frames. But words by themselves 
are generalised, abstract, unindividuated, impersonal: it is only rhythm and punctuation and 
‘the whole choreography of discourse’ (1984, 849) that can animate them with a will, a 
direction, an individual nuance, a singular coloration. But rhythm itself is, to all intents and 
purposes, pre-verbal (‘and what can the rhythm of thought be but that of the hardly 
conscious, emerging movements which accompany it?’ (1984, 850)); rhythm does not derive 
from words, it is rather the reverse (1984, 849-50). 
This is a view of rhythm with which we have a great deal of sympathy, but with 
which our own view does not entirely tally. Rhythm is a mode of expression, but also a mode 
of apprehension: perception is an active faculty. Diction/reading aloud, in other words, is not 
a purely assimilative process; it is also an exploration of, and experimentation with, what the 
reader wishes for the words-of-the-text and what they seem to wish for themselves in this 
particular variational sequence. Thus, while Bergson’s case draws much on the assumption 
that words entail the substitution of concepts for things and promote ‘the socialization of 
truth’ (1984, 1327), our view is that words are things and that they look to the reading voice 
to achieve their potential complexity. Rhythm is not pre-verbal, a force passing through 
words and upon which words are invited to cast their light; rhythm is awakened by words, 
and, as a result, constantly animates and inflects sense, in such a way that words never fall 
back into default positions, that is, positions of ‘average’ meaning, of standard function, of 
generalised and abstract status.   
The translational ambitions I have described are an abjuration of the notion of 
validity, in the belief that it is politically tendentious and untrustworthy. Validity assumes 
that compliance with certain predetermined conditions gives a document, an action, or an 
activity, legitimacy, justification, a warrant. In this sense, validation is a sifting process, a 
triage, which supposes that some things are state-condoned and licit, while others are not, or, 
further, that these things are only state-condoned if they fulfil demands expressly laid down 
by the state, where ‘state’ is to be understood as any organ which, among other means, exerts 
power through a body of concepts/lexical terms used as yardsticks of behaviour or licences 
for actions. In intellectual matters, the state is to be understood as the academic institution. To 
be validated, research (research-based practice) must be assimilated into state procedures. 
Translation, as we imagine it, falls outside the given pattern of validation: the authoritative 
establishment of the original text (source text), which must be preserved; the justness of the 
translation (judged by one’s peers); the translator’s own accredited status (special 
dispensations are made for poet-translators whose status is reckoned to be validation enough). 
My version of translation undoes these validations: translation is designed to destabilize the 
source text, to discompose it, by searching out multiple texts within it, the ‘invisible’, the 
expressive (re)configurations it makes possible; the translation is not preserving the source 
text in another language, but projecting it into a metamorphic becoming, into a future of 
continuous variation; and the translator is in no sense ‘qualified’, but is, rather, the common 
reader, whose translations are records of the experience of reading. In the terms of Deleuze 
and Guattari, this version of translation is rhizomatic in its unfolding, minoritarian and de-
territorializing. 
As a final, brief piece of supporting evidence for this anti-validity argument, I would 
like to present four ‘renderings’ (Figs. 1-4) of some lines from Jules Laforgue’s ‘Dimanches 
(I)’ (Derniers Vers (1890)): 
  Ainsi donc, pauvre, pâle et piètre individu 
  Qui ne croit à son Moi qu’à ses moments perdus, 
  Je vis s’effacer ma fiancée 
  Emportée par le cours des choses, 
  Telle l’épine voit s’effeuiller, 
  Sous prétexte de soir sa meilleure rose. 
 
Even as I produce the translation, the senses of the words, the utterances, are inflected by my 
associated consciousness of other lines and collocations from the Derniers Vers, which are 
feathered into the text. This process is orchestrated against, and made more complex by, the 
textual re-dispositions and the heteroglossia of different typefaces. And the larger, passing 
preoccupations of this particular reader – photographs, painted figures, collaged materials - 
become an added layer of perspectives on these lines, which translation absorbs into the text 
in such a way that the play of both sense and the physical senses is further reconfigured. Both 
the reader and the text are being constantly re-woven by new inputs, new associations, new 
memories, in a process which converts collage (inserted fragments) into metamorphosis, into 
continuous variation. And these versions can be read in any order, the principle of variation 
will work just as well. In Fig. 1, I think the lines photographically, drawing on a collection of 
WWI portraits, African art, the odd contemporary street scene; in Fig. 2, I visit relics: not 
rose-petals but camellia-petals with their added literary/operatic overtones, a name (‘Fidelle’) 
sewn on coarse cloth, but on the reverse, so that it is both illegible and as if unravelling, a 
discarded piece of ribbon; in Fig. 3, which, with its mention of ‘Novels for the quaysides, 
elegiac photos’ (from Laforgue’s ‘Lament of the Barrel Organ’, in Graham Dunstan Martin’s 
translation (1998)), relates to Figs. 2 and 1, handwriting and a tracery of enamel paint enact a 
directly gestural response, opening up the text to kinaesthetic drives and the imprinting of the 
graphological; and in Fig. 4, while the red enamel paint picks up the camellia petals of Fig. 2, 
the blue, collaged extracts from my translation of Apollinaire’s ‘The Windows’, a poem 
dedicated to the work of Robert Delaunay, provide a construction of skylights in the text, 
opening on to a mobile world of relentlessly changing sensation, which makes dramas of the 
heart seem peculiarly outmoded. 
Practice-based research allows one to make claims for a version of translation that 
research-based practice occludes. In fact, practice-based research reverses the assumptions on 
which research-based practice is based. For research-based practice, research establishes the 
facts, and the discipline develops the appropriate methodologies for interpreting and applying 
them; the scholar becomes the agent of the discipline’s outworking. But what if reading does 
not primarily serve the development of an institutional book-culture based on literary 
categories, hierarchies, history? What if the value of reading is reckoned to lie in existential 
objectives of the kind we have outlined, including self-coordination, self-improvisation, an 
intuitional activity in which reading, as a mutual undertaking between author and reader, 
constantly expands the field of energies released by a text?  In this latter world, there are no 
facts, no methodologies or recognized procedures, only an accumulating body of evidence, 
marshalled by practice-based research, the promise of an inexhaustible inner duration, of a 
becoming, driven by the rhythms of creative consciousness. Practice-based research offers 
itself, then, as the repository both of countless contacts between the existential energies and 
horizons of different languages and the kaleidoscopic and inexhaustibly heterogeneous 
experience of reading subjects. 
 
NOTES 
1. As Henri Bergson puts it: ‘However, language designates states with the same words 
for everyone; thus it has only been able to fix the objective and impersonal aspect of 
love, of hatred, and of the countless feelings which stir the soul’ (1984, 108-9). I give 
all quotations from Bergson in my own English translation; page references indicate 
the locations of the French originals. 
2. Translation is an activity that necessarily takes place in a reality in which nothing 
repeats itself; as Bergson puts it: ‘If everything is in time, everything changes 
internally and the same concrete reality never repeats itself’ (1984, 533). 
3. Just to remind ourselves of one of Bergson’s succinct definitions of intuition: 
‘“Intuition” here is the sympathy through which one penetrates the interior of an 
object, to coincide with what is unique and consequently inexpressible about it’ 
(1984, 1395). 
4. ‘All translations of a poem into all possible languages can add shades of meaning to 
shades of meaning as much as they like and, by a kind of mutual retouching, with 
reciprocal correction, provide an ever more faithful image of the poem being 
translated, but they will never render the inner meaning of the original’ (1984, 1395).    
5. ‘A representation from a certain point of view, a translation made with certain 
symbols, remain obstinately imperfect when compared with the object which is the 
subject of the point of view or which the symbols seek to express’ (1984, 1395). 
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